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ABSTRACT
The present paper explores the relationship between agrarian structure
and human capital formation between and within Brazil’s federal units. It
is argued that whether states’ agriculture is in plantation style, based on
cheap coerced labor, or organized around family farming matters for the
formulation of educational policies. According to the main claim, landlords
were not interested in paying higher taxes to educate the masses and cur-
tailed the expansion of schooling in order to keep a cheap workforce and
maintain their monopoly over the decision-making process. Describing
several episodes in Brazil’s history of public instruction, the paper stresses
the distributional conflicts over education as well as the rural aristocracy’s
resistance towards broadly-targeted, citizenship-enhancing educational
policies. The descriptive evidence is complemented by statistical analyses
employing historical as well as more recent data. It is shown that states
characterized by a more egalitarian land distribution, which are not under
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the dominance of powerful landlords, exhibit better educational coverage
and enhanced instruction quality. They also spend more on schooling.
Keywords: land inequality, education, landlords, Brazil
JEL Code: N00, O13, 015, 054
RESUMEN
El presente artı´culo estudia la relacio´n entre la estructura agraria y la
formacio´n de capital humano, tanto dentro como entre las unidades feder-
ales de Brasil. Se argumenta que la agricultura de los Estados es de estilo
plantacio´n — basado en mano de obra forzada barata, o por el contrario
organizada alrededor de la granja familiar — es crucial para la formulacio´n
de las polı´ticas educativas. De acuerdo a esta hipo´tesis, los propietarios de la
tierra no estaban interesados en pagar impuestos ma´s altos para educar a las
masas y restringieron la expansio´n escolar con la intencio´n de mantener una
mano de obra barata y el monopolio del proceso de toma de decisiones. A
trave´s de la descripcio´n de distintos episodios de la historia de la instruccio´n
pu´blica en Brasil, el artı´culo muestra los conflictos distributivos sobre la
educacio´n y la resistencia de la aristocracia rural en relacio´n con los ma´s
amplios objetivos ciudadanos para intensificar las polı´ticas educativas. La
evidencia descriptiva se complementa con el ana´lisis estadı´stico de datos
histo´ricos y recientes. Se muestra que los Estados con una distribucio´n
ma´s igualitaria de la tierra, que no esta´n bajo el dominio de poderosos
propietarios de la tierra, tuvieron una mejor cobertura y calidad educativa.
Asimismo, demostramos que invirtieron ma´s en escolarizacio´n.
Palabras clave: desigualdad de tierra, latifundistas, educacio´n, Brasil
1. INTRODUCTION
Few claims seem to be as uncontested within the development debate as
the importance of schooling for the prosperity of nations. The new growth
theory emphasizes the role of human capital in increasing economic output.
Also, recent studies suggest that investments in education are among the
most effective tools for pulling individuals out of the poverty trap or reducing
social inequalities within countries. Furthermore, it has been argued that
educated citizens are politically more engaged and better prepared to hold
politicians accountable for their actions.
If human capital is so important for explaining economic growth,
inequality, poverty and political accountability, what are the factors driving
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the production of educational policies, the accumulation of human capital
and the distributional conflicts over different schooling levels? Surprisingly,
this question has only received scant attention from the development
literature. Following Gary Becker’s (1964) seminal work, economists fre-
quently refer to the costs and returns from schooling when explaining
different levels of human capital. Political scientists emphasize the role of
electoral competition for the provision of broadly targeted educational
policies. Within the field of political economy, scholars stress the political
power distribution and the predominance of private interests over public
purposes in the formulation and implementation of educational policies.
Much of this existing literature, however, can be criticized for largely
ignoring distributional conflicts over different educational levels and arguing
in a rather static and unhistorical fashion.
Recently, a growing body of literature has focused on structural factors
when analyzing educational outcomes. Among these factors, modernization
and globalization are frequently cited. One important element, however, has
been neglected: nations’ agrarian production system. Whether a country’s
agriculture is characterized by large plantations based on cheap hired labor
or rather organized around family farming may have left long-lasting foot-
prints on its educational systems. Although some macrocomparative studies
have analyzed this issue in one or another way (Lindert 2004a; Erickson and
Vollrath 2004; Galor et al. 2009; Wegenast 2009), the causal mechanisms
linking agrarian production systems to human capital formation have been
largely omitted. In a first attempt to address this shortcoming, this paper
probes more deeply into the relationship between agrarian structure and
education, trying to capture large landowners’ attitudes toward mass
schooling. For this purpose, it will concentrate on Brazil’s landowning elites,
providing both qualitative and quantitative evidence for the proposed claim.
The analysis reaffirms that agriculture shaped regional development
processes by having long-lasting effects on educational policies. It is claimed
that regions exhibiting a plantation-style agrarian structure tend to neglect
broadly targeted educational policies, spending disproportionately more on
higher education for the elite. The results of both descriptive as well as
inferential statistical analyses point out that federal units with high degrees
of land inequality and an agrarian economy historically based on the culti-
vation of crops grown on large plantations show lower schooling coverage,
an inferior instruction quality and spend less on education. In contrast, states
exhibiting a history of smaller family-owned farms were among the first
to develop an encompassing school system featuring better educational
indicators.
Different causal mechanisms may explain the proposed relationship. The
paper’s main argument suggests that Brazil’s politically influential agrarian
elite had no interest in the promotion of schooling. Most likely, large land-
owners were reluctant to subsidize the education of the masses by paying
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higher taxes. Not only would expanded education cost more through taxes,
but education could lead rural workers to seek better-paid jobs in the devel-
oping urban sector, threatening the supply of a cheap labor force. In addition,
keeping the biggest share of the population illiterate would guarantee land-
lords’ monopoly over the decision-making process, given the existence of
suffrage laws based on literacy. Furthermore, it would hamper individuals’
capacity for political mobilization and articulation. Finally, school visits
would keep the young population from working on landowners’ fields.
The paper proceeds in the following way: the next section briefly reviews
the existing literature, pointing to the paper’s proposed theoretical as well as
empirical contribution and elaborating on the case selection criteria. Sub-
sequently, the possible mechanisms lying behind the relationship between
agrarian structure and educational outcomes will be elucidated. Section four
refers to some instances of Brazil’s history of education and describes
landlords’ instruments of political domination. States’ different agrarian
structures are presented subsequently. A descriptive analysis of 19th century
schooling data within and across single states as well as a depiction of
more recent data revealing a path-dependence in agrarian structure and
educational performance are presented in the following part. Section seven
summarizes the results of cross-sectional regression analyses on a range of
educational indicators for the 21st century. The final section concludes by
highlighting the main findings and pointing to areas of future research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW, EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION AND
CASE SELECTION
Different authors have analyzed how landownership structures might
exert a persistent influence on the politics of societies. Barrington Moore
(1966) was among the first scholars to consider agrarian class relations as a
predictor of political transformation processes. Studying regime transitions,
Moore explained European democratic breakdowns with the existence of
large landholdings and the survival of a powerful class of landowners into the
period of modernization. Subsequently, other scholars linked patterns of
land inequality to change or resilience of political regimes. Stressing the
social control patterns of regions characterized by high rural inequality,
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), for example, argue that small- and medium-scale
agriculture is conducive to democratization, whereas countries with large
landholdings are inimical to democratic transition.
More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) and Boix (2003)
emphasized the role of redistribution when assessing the impact of land
inequality on regime outcomes. In their work, landlords — as owners of
immobile assets — would face greater threats of taxation and expropriation,
if democratization were to occur. Thus, they try to impede the opening up of
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the political system. Boix (2003, p. 40) goes as far as stating that «[T]he
absence of landlordism constitutes a necessary precondition for the triumph
of democracy.»
Closely related to the papers cited above is the influential work of Stanley
Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff (1997, 2005) linking initial factor endow-
ments to different paths of development within the Americas. Stressing the
role of geography for the development of nations, the authors link geo-
graphic conditions to particular paths of colonization, which, according to
them, translated into different institutional arrangements. Their main claim
is that Latin America’s land endowments encouraged the production of
commodities featuring economies of scale and the employment of slave
labor — so called cash crops. This initial inequality led to the development
of institutional structures that advantaged members of elite classes, con-
ferring them with more political influence and better access to economic
opportunities. These institutions perpetuated the high levels of inequality
and contributed to the persistence of poor development in the long run.
Despite the role attributed to land inequality for nations’ development
process, the effect of agrarian structures on the distinct patterns of human
capital accumulation remains underexplored by the literature. This is
remarkable because, as early as 1959, Douglass North acknowledged a link
between agrarian production patterns and education. According to the author,
a landowner under the unequal plantation agrarian type «will be extremely
reluctant to devote his tax monies to expenditures for education or research
other than that related to the staple commodity» (North 1959, p. 946).
Among the few studies connecting educational outcomes with agrarian
structures, three cross-national analyses and two recent case studies can be
pointed out. Lindert (2004a, 2004b) considers various factors explaining stu-
dent enrollment in primary school between 1881 and 1937. By using the share
of men who voted as proxy for landed interest power, the author employs
cross-sectional regression analysis and concludes that much of the blame for
delaying the expansion of primary education resided in powerful landed elites
«opposed to schooling the masses at tax payer expenses» (Lindert 2004b,
p. 33). Studying education across the New World from 1800 to 1925, Mariscal
and Sokoloff (2000) find that differences in land inequality explain differences
in public provision of schooling, arguing that land disparities create collective
action problems within the political units responsible for education funding.
Wegenast (2009) uses countries’ export composition to proxy for the agrarian
structure and concludes that the export of cash crops has led countries
to underinvest in secondary schooling and partly explains the educational
differences found between Asia and Latin America.
In a case study of Indian districts, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) demonstrate
that areas in which property rights were historically given to landlords
received significantly lower investments in health and education. Although
very insightful and methodologically innovative, the paper does not further
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explore the reasons for the lack of educational spending within the Indian
districts typically dominated by landlords1. Galor et al. (2009) find a negative
effect of land inequality on education expenditure using cross-sectional data
on the United States from the beginning of the 20th century. The authors
claim that capitalists benefited from the accumulation of human capital by
the masses, while landlords were «the prime hurdle for industrial develop-
ment and social mobility» (Ibid, p. 173).
As is evident from the discussed literature, empirical documentation of the
relationship between agrarian structure and education is limited. Furthermore,
no previous study seems to be able to distinguish which mechanisms are at
work. Most of the scholars settle for providing assumptions that may explain
the statistical correlation. So far, authors have, for example, failed to look into
landlords’ attitudes toward educational expansion in greater detail.
With their economy based primarily on agricultural products for several
centuries and their inherent variation of agrarian structures, the Brazilian
states provide a rich setting for further assessing the relationship between
agriculture and education. Despite the historical importance of agriculture
for the Brazilian economy, the impact of structural variables such as the
agrarian production system or the country’s schooling performance remain
unexplored. To the best of the current author’s knowledge, Naritomi et al.
(2007) offer the first attempt to associate episodes of Brazilian agrarian
production with institutional quality and provision of public goods. The
authors show that municipalities affected by the rent-seeking cycles of the
colonial period («sugarcane cycle» and «gold cycle») feature worse institu-
tions and less broadly targeted public policies.
In line with the last paper, this study attempts to address the gap in the
current development literature by asking whether the agrarian production
system has a lasting impact on educational policies. Answering this question
within a single-country context is particularly useful for different reasons.
Foremost, it reduces the complexity of having to deal with different insti-
tutional arrangements (e.g. legal, electoral or constitutive system) or macro-
social forces such as multiple colonizers, which is a typical drawback of
cross-country approaches2. Apart from relatively constant macroinstitutional
variables, we have detailed information about how agrarian structure and
schooling might have coevolved. Thus, potential problems arising from the
omitted variable bias or endogeneity are minimized.
Finally, the question of why Brazil was selected to test the proposed
hypotheses at a subnational level must be addressed. Since the early 19th
1 The authors limit themselves to observing that «the key to what happened may lie in the
relative inability of the landlord districts to claim their fair share of public investment» (Banerjee
and Iyer 2005, p. 1191).
2 This does not imply, however, that Brazil’s federal units do not exhibit different regional
histories or different informal institutions.
TIM WEGENAST
108 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
century, responsibility for funding primary and secondary schooling falls
mainly to the states and municipalities, with educational indicators varying
substantially across the federal units. Also, agrarian products have domi-
nated the Brazilian production and export structure throughout history.
Concerning the states’ landownership patterns, there is enough variation to
possibly justify differences within observable educational outcomes. In states
such as Espı´rito Santo, Santa Catarina or Parana´, for example, factor
endowments and the settlement process led to an agrarian structure based on
smaller properties. In contrast, provinces hosting the sugarcane or coffee
cycle share a common history of land disparities and powerful agrarian
interests. A final practical reason concerns the availability of historical as
well as more recent state-level data. Brazil is probably one of the few
developing countries to have kept records of its educational figures during
the 19th century and reports reliable data for the past decades.
3. THE ARGUMENTS
As outlined in the last section, large landowners are believed to have
historically exerted considerable political influence over the policymaking
process, blocking large transformation processes such as democratization.
Max Weber (1917), for example, blamed east Prussian Junkers for much of
Prussia’s political ills. Following this line of reasoning, the present paper
focuses on rural class relations and attributes the lack of schooling oppor-
tunities to the special interests of a politically influential landowning elite.
It assumes that landlords have high incentives to influence public policy3.
The variation in levels of political power, resulting from diverging agrarian
structures, may predict educational outcomes.
Different political economy arguments are presented in order to explain
landed elites’ resistance toward mass education. Considering that the expan-
sion of schooling is a costly undertaking requiring public money and that
human capital is not necessarily complementary to plantation work, landlords
had no interest in financing the education of the masses through higher
taxation. Lindert (2004b, p. 33), for example, argues that where «political voice
was restricted to those holding substantial property, poor children got little
help from the taxpayers.» Another economic reason for keeping the popula-
tion uneducated was landlords’ dependence on the constant supply of cheap
labor. Educated workers could emigrate to the emerging urban sector, leading
to a shortage of labor and an increase in salaries (see Galor et al. 2009).
In addition, school visits would keep the young population from working on
landowners’ fields.
3 Frieden (1991), for example, argues that sectors like agriculture, in which assets are specific
and cannot be easily transferred for other uses, have the most to gain from influencing governments.
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Politically, landlords tried to maintain their monopoly over the decision-
making process by restricting the population’s access to schooling. In Brazil,
for example, suffrage laws were conditioned on literacy by the «Lei Saraiva»
in 1881 and remained unchanged until 1988. Given that 70 per cent of the
total population over 9 years of age was illiterate in 1920 (see Engerman and
Sokoloff 2001; Table 4), restricting the franchise and keeping workers
uneducated was certainly an effective tool to avoid political competition.
Furthermore, it is known from political sociology that education is con-
ducive to political mobilization and participation (see Downs 1957 or Brady
et al. 1995)4. Thus, by blocking the expansion of the schooling system, the
agrarian elite constrained workers’ ability to overcome their collective action
problem, preventing them from mobilizing to seek better working conditions
and more political empowerment.
Apart from the opposition coming from the landowning class, it can be
expected that family-type agriculture based on smaller plots is conducive to
the accumulation of human capital due to other reasons of an individual,
socioeconomic nature. Since land is frequently used as a collateral asset to
gain capital market access, rural property owners can better afford to send
their children to school5. Owning land titles also increases the likelihood of
agriculture investments. Compared to landless hired laborers or tenants,
land owners are more likely to invest in their property, for example, by
buying modern technology such as tractors or fertilizers, as shown by Galiani
and Schargrodsky (2006). Furthermore, these last two authors show that
land titling affects fertility and reduces a household’s size. Fewer children
make post-basic education more affordable for their parents6.
Finally, empirical evidence shows that investments in new agricultural
technologies are greater in areas with a high share of landed relative to landless
households (see Foster and Rosenzweig 1996, 2004 or Banerjee and Iyer 2005).
The earlier and more intense introduction of new technology increases parents’
incentives to send their children to post-basic schools, given that modern
agriculture requires qualified skills. Some findings show that technological
change and the corresponding rise in yields made education more valuable and
led to an increased demand for schooling. Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), for
example, demonstrate that expected future agricultural technology increases
the number of schools as well as enrollment in landed households.
4 Employing a probability sample of 1484 rural Senegalese citizens, Kuenzi (2006) examines
the effect of formal and informal education on political participation. Among other interesting
results, the author finds a positive and statistically significant effect of formal education on voting
and community participation. Using a data set for sixty-nine village communities in two north
Indian States, Krishna (2002) concludes that both more educated and informed people are politi-
cally more active.
5 For studies analyzing the relationship between land inequality and credit market access, see
Galor and Zeira (1993) or Field and Torero (2006).
6 For studies on fertility and schooling, see Barro and Becker (1989) or Dessy (2000).
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It is important to note that this paper concentrates on the political
economy argument, rather than analyzing the individual socioeconomic
motivations of people living under distinct agrarian structures to invest in
education. Thus, it will mostly stress the role of large landowners in the
formulation of educational policies. For this purpose, the next section
summarizes the Brazilian history of education, presenting descriptive evi-
dence of how the country’s schooling system was shaped by the interests of
special groups such as the traditional rural aristocracy. Its main purpose is to
shed light on the causal mechanisms that may lie behind the statistical
associations to be presented in the upcoming empirical analysis.
4. A COMMON HISTORY OF LANDLORDS (OR THE LACK THEREOF)
In order to understand the formation of the society and the modern state in
Brazil, one inevitably has to consider the role played by the country’s rural
oligarchy. Describing the distribution of power within Brazil, Chilcote (1990,
p. 10), for example, notes that the «ruling class has traditionally been composed
of a small group of families whose power stems from the ownership of property.»
As owners of large plots of land, these politically influential landowners
were highly dependent on the supply of a cheap labor force, as plantation
work was very labor intensive. Landlords’ concern in maintaining the supply
of a cheap workforce and the monopoly over the rural properties was emi-
nent and traceable by different courses of action. One of these measures, for
example, consisted in blocking the access to land for the peasant population.
This was achieved with the help of the government, who stipulated land
prices that were unaffordable for the rural poor. The use of violence in order
to dislodge invaders or rural occupants without land titling was also very
common (see Guimaraes 1968, pp. 91-92). Furthermore, the establishment of
semifeudal forms of tenancy, or the use of debt peonage, was increasingly
employed to retain the traditional coercion power over labor.
Brazil’s educational backwardness can be directly linked to the country’s
landed elites mentioned above. In the country’s 500 years of history, serious
attempts to implement a sound educational system were not made before the
second half of the 20th century. As noted by Havighurst and Moreira (1965),
the Jesuit colleges were almost the only centers of intellectual culture in
Brazil during the colonial era. The main beneficiaries were sons of the rural
aristocracy, owners of sugar plantations and sugar mills. After Brazil’s
independence from Portugal, primary as well as secondary education fell
into the hands of the provincial legislative assemblies. The decentralization
of primary and secondary schooling can be seen as the central state’s attempt
to free itself from almost all educational responsibilities.
Reports of traditional rural forces resisting educational expansion plans
are often found in local newspaper reports of the 19th century. An article
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from the newspaper O Universal (June 14, 1842), for example, addressed the
question of whether it was dangerous to educate the lower classes of society.
The newspaper advocated the benefits of educating the poor affirming that
«ignorance is the company of anarchy and demagogy.» Furthermore, the
editor claimed that the instruction would only strengthen people’s compre-
hension over the «inviolability of properties — an important pillar of the
Brazilian society» (see Faria Filho 1999, p. 120, translated by the author).
The article clearly addresses the traditional landed elites’ fear concerning
educational expansion.
Another example of landlords’ repudiation of mass schooling is an initiative
by the Emperor D. Pedro I in the year 1823, which illustrates the unequal
importance that basic public instruction had vis-a`-vis university education. While
a project of educating Brazil’s youth (Tratado de Educacao para a Mocidade
Brasileira) was never approved by the Constituent Assembly dominated by con-
servative representatives of the traditional agrarian sector, the creation of two
universities in the cities of Sa˜o Paulo and Olinda was promptly and unanimously
decided (Saviani 1987, p. 41). A few months later, landlords would send their
children to the law faculties of these universities to prepare them for public life.
It was the only schooling project approved by the Assembly, which is emblematic
of the government’s resistance to broadly targeted public instruction.
The situation of Brazil’s schooling system did not improve with the end of
the monarchy. The so-called Old Republic (1889-1930) is believed to have
largely represented the interests of the agrarian elite7. Both the executive and
legislative bodies were used to maintain the power of states’ oligarchies and
promote federal decentralization. This oligarchy was directly linked to the
agricultural export economy and the latifundia structure (see Saviani 1987,
p. 37). The constitution abolished free and compulsory education, reversing
education legislation and maintaining this situation for more than four dec-
ades. In addition, it conditioned the right to vote on literacy criteria. In this
manner, privileges from the slavery period and patriarchal forms of access to
economic and social resources were maintained. The law Lei Maior from 1891
declined the establishment of a national organization for education, pushing
for even greater decentralization of the educational system. Governors of the
provinces appointed school inspectors who were chosen by the so-called
colonels to control the pedagogic activities of teachers8. In this way, workers’
contestation or manifestations of discontent were easily suppressed.
At last, the first major educational reform known as Lei Rocha Vaz or
Reforma Joao Alves in the year 1925 obliged the union to partially subsidize
7 This period of Brazilian history is known as Repu´blica das Oligarquias (Republic of the Oli-
garchies). During this period, all presidents came from two major political parties: Partido Repub-
licano Paulista (PRP) and Partido Republicano Mineiro (PRM). Both parties represented the interests
of the agrarian elite, especially the coffee producers from Sa˜o Paulo and Minas Gerais.
8 Brazilian landowners were (and often still are) considered as being colonels («corone´is»).
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primary teachers’ salary in rural schools. As mentioned in an account of the
national Ministry for Education, however, the apparent shortage of federal
resources, the elites’ fear of the massive incorporation of new voters and the
defense of states’ autonomy left this dimension of the reform completely
ineffective (see MEC 2000). Even the proposal of reintroducing free and
compulsory primary schooling, discussed during the constitutional revision
of 1925-1926, could not be approved. As will become evident in section 6,
the politically important states of Minas Gerais and Sa˜o Paulo — home
of powerful landlords — exhibited poorer educational records than more
egalitarian states throughout this period.
After the world economic crisis of 1929, the steep decline in Brazil’s
coffee exports and massive flight of capital, industrial development began
to emerge as capital was being gradually transferred from the agricultural
to the industrial sector. With the abolition of the Old Republic and the
establishment of the Second Republic, rising social movements, increas-
ing industrialization, the growing demand for a specialized labor force and
the gradual reduction of governments’ subsidies for agricultural produc-
tion generated a broader consensus over the necessity for educational
spending.
The intent to institutionalize public, free, compulsory and gender-equal
education by the reformers around minister Campos (the so-called «pioneers
of the new education») resulted in a major ideological clash between tradi-
tional sectors of the society (mainly the church and the coffee, cattle and
sugar oligarchies) and a renovating movement (representing the interests of
a growing middle class, composed mainly of intellectuals, bureaucrats,
merchants, industrial workers and military officers). With the implementa-
tion of public and free education, traditional forces were not only afraid of a
private school drain, but also worried about losing their privileges as a
consequence of the school enrollment of broad social classes. Chapter II of
the 1934 Constitution can be seen as a victory of the renovating movement
over the old elites. As evident in the next paragraph, however, this victory
only lasted for 3 years.
A backlash to this positive development took place with the enacting of
the 1937 constitution and the beginning of the so-called Estado Novo,
which can be seen as a product of elites’ fears concerning the growing
request for more social democratization and the exclusionary nature of the
modernization process. According to Romanelli (1978, p. 153), the political
context under the Estado Novo forced the previous ideological dispute over
the educational question to enter a particular state of «hibernation.» The
Constitution of 1937 put considerably less emphasis on education than
the previous one, stressing the liberty of the individual initiative and
exempting the State from providing universal education (see article 129).
Social stratification and the country’s cultural heritage heavily influenced
the choice of the educational model to be followed. In the composition
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of the new schooling system, the interests of the prevailing patriarchal
rural elite — with its archaic educational ideas — prevailed (see Romanelli
1978, p. 56).
With the end of the Estado Novo in 1946, a new constitution of liberal and
democratic character returned to the principle of «education as everyone’s
right» developed in the first half of the 1930s and expanded federal compe-
tencies to legislate over national education. The discussion around the Lei
das Diretrizes, a law that took 13 years to be finally approved by Congress in
the year 1961, is another good example for the intense ideological battles
fought between conservative and liberal democratic forces (the so-called
«pioneers»). Among other achievements, a Ministry of Education (Ministe´rio
da Educacao e Cultura — MEC), a national plan for education (Plano
Nacional de Educacao) and a national literacy program (Plano Nacional de
Alfabetizacao) were established.
Although this law was an important attempt to unify the country’s edu-
cational system, the reform was not far-reaching and was perceived as
unprogressive, reactionary, inefficient and a mere anachronism by many
intellectuals (see Fernandes 1966, p. 347 or Lima 1974, p. 65). In the end, the
alliance between rural conservatives and the antidemocratic forces within
the modern sector managed to curtail profound reforms, defeating the more
ambitious intentions of the liberal democrats (see Romanelli 1978, p. 190).
Values of the old social order were perpetuated through the selective and
discriminatory secondary and higher educational system, designated to
prepare the elite for liberal professions. Referring to the Lei das Diretrizes,
Fernandes (1966, p. 353) maintains that «the senators yielded to the real
owners of power, in an undeniable demonstration that the whole Congress is
still enslaved by the particularistic interests of the dominating traditional
class» (translated by the author). Furthermore, he affirms that it was a
«backward educational system, coherent with the old Brazilian manorial,
seigniorial regime» (Ibid, p. 24).
During the military regime from 1964 to 1985, the Brazilian schooling
system promoted by the state had the intention to propagate the dominant
ideology and guarantee the reproduction of the social structure (see, e.g.
Beisiegel 1974, pp. 178-179 or Manfredi 1978, pp. 158-159). After the
redemocratization, a substantial improvement of educational indicators
can be noted. Especially in the last 15 years, illiteracy has decreased
considerably and primary as well as secondary schooling coverage have
reached satisfactory levels. Nevertheless, the country’s educational system
still lacks quality and lags behind many other developing countries. A
second major problem is Brazil’s disproportional educational spending. The
following statistical analysis will show that — even in more recent times —
educational backwardness remains especially pronounced in states that are
dependent on a rural economy and, at the same time, exhibit unequal
agrarian structures.
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By briefly summarizing Brazil’s history of education, this section
demonstrated that the country’s schooling system often reflected the inter-
ests of the ruling classes, especially the rural aristocracy. The subsequent
section describes the historical roots of the unequal land ownership patterns,
stressing the differences of the agrarian structure across Brazil. According to
the paper’s argumentation, these differences can be made accountable for
the cross-state variance in landlords’ political power and the observable
divergence in the human capital formation process. As will become evident,
the influence of a landed elite left enduring footprints on the educational
records of many states.
5. BRAZIL’S AGRARIAN STRUCTURE: FIVE CENTURIES OF
LAND CONCENTRATION
The highly unequal Brazilian land distribution with the predominance of
large estates has its origin in the colonial period. As the Brazilian historian
Caio Prado Jr wrote, «latifundium, slavery and the export trade remained for
more than three hundred years the principle institutions of Brazilian society»
(as cited in Dean 1971, p. 607). And, despite evidence of the superior
economic viability of smaller estates observable in other regions such as
Western Europe, the country’s land tenure system remained concentrated.
According to Guimaraes (1968, p. 201), the Brazilian plantation system
reached modern times with sufficient power to maintain control over the
agrarian economy.
In a first attempt to populate the recently discovered country, Portugal’s
King Joa˜o III divided Brazil into fifteen territories called Capitanias Heredita´rias
(Hereditary Captaincies) — areas granted to Portuguese grantees (captains)
with hereditary succession. Seeking to extract profit out of sugarcane planta-
tions, a second settlement attempt was initiated in the 17th century, fostering
the so-called «sugarcane cycle9.» In another land-concentrating effort, the
crown offered royal grants in the form of large tracts of land (sesmarias) to
anyone able to pay 300-400 milreis (375-500 US$ in the year 1800) to cover the
formalities. Granted unsystematically and corruptly, the sesmarias contributed
to the formation of an aristocratic class of latifundia owners enjoying complete
property rights over their holdings.
Even the abolition of slavery did not alter the land tenure system and
Brazil entered the 20th century with a highly unequal land distribution,
characterized by the coexistence of latifundios and the so-called minifundios
9 The sugarcane cycle was Brazil’s first organized economic activity and lasted from the 16th to
the 18th century. Sugar mills were installed along the north- and southeast coast, with the states of
Bahia and Pernambuco being the major producers. Cultivation took place on very large estates and
was based on African slave labor. With the emergence of sugar beet and the cultivation know-how
gained from the Dutch, Brazilian sugar production lost its importance in the 18th century.
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(very small plots of land incapable of ensuring an adequate living). Table 1
shows the land concentration measured by the Gini index as of 1950 and the
percentage of the total area corresponding to the 50 per cent smallest plots
TABLE 1
LAND CONCENTRATION ACROSS STATES
States Landgini (1950) Area of 50% smallest plots (1967)
Distrito Federal 3.3
Goia´s 4.7
Espı´rito Santo 0.529 14.1
Roraima 0.614 13.9
Santa Catarina 0.669 9.4
Parana´ 0.73 9.2
Ceara´ 0.747 4.7
Rio Grande do Sul 0.757 7.8
Minas Gerais 0.759 4.6
Sa˜o Paulo 0.77 5.5
Rio de Janeiro 0.79 3.7
Bahia 0.799 4.4
Piauı´ 0.8 4.1
Paraı´ba 0.808 4.3
Rio Grande do Norte 0.808 4.2
Sergipe 0.813 3.9
Pernambuco 0.834 3.8
Mato Grosso 0.844 1.1
Alagoas 0.845 4.5
Para´ 0.888 2.5
Acre 0.907 0.3
Amazonas 0.923 1.9
Rondonia 0.928 0.4
Maranha˜o 0.932 3.1
Amapa´ 0.935 1.6
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up to the median in the year 196710. The northern states with very low
population densities such as Para´, Acre, Amazonas, Rondonia, Maranha˜o or
Amapa´ exhibit the highest land inequalities. Except for Maranha˜o, these are
all frontier states in which the geography is dominated by the Amazon
Forest. With Gini indices ranging from 0.76 to 0.85, historically important
states with a past of plantation-style, export-oriented agricultural production
still exhibited a concentrated land ownership structure in 1950. The histor-
ical sugarcane plantations from Pernambuco, Paraı´ba and Alagoas, the
cocoa and sugarcane cultivations in Bahia11, the coffee production in Sa˜o
Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro12 or the cattle breeding and mineral
extraction in Mato Grosso and Minas Gerais left footprints on the states’ land
tenure conditions.
Four states are frequently referred to as having a different agrarian land
structure: Santa Catarina, Espı´rito Santo, Parana´ and — to a lesser extent —
Rio Grande do Sul. Plots between 25 and 30 hectares were no exception
within these states, guaranteeing families’ subsistence and small surpluses
(see IBGE 1946, p. 58). Within these states, the latifundia system was never
as widespread and powerful as in the coffee or sugar plantation zones13.
In 1960, the percentage of plots smaller than 100 hectares corresponding to
the states’ total area in Espı´rito Santo, Santa Catarina and Parana´ were 54.7,
52.4 and 46.3 per cent, respectively. These numbers were significantly lower
in federal units with a latifundia tradition such as Pernambuco (35.2 per
cent), Bahia (33.6 per cent) or Alagoas (32.2 per cent; see Guimaraes 1968,
p. 221).
In the state of Santa Catarina, the concession of the already mentioned
sesmarias during the 17th and 18th centuries was granted to the destitute
population rather than to nobles or wealthy individuals (Fiori 1991, p. 27).
Because of this, according to Cabral (1968, p. 192), Santa Catarina never
experienced the «colonial society that prevailed in other areas, the wealthy
and powerful sugar barons, the masters and slaves. The latifundia system
10 The data on the land Ginis were taken from the report of the 1995-1996 Censo Agropecua´rio
from the Insituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatı´stica (IBGE). Data on the area corresponding to the
50 per cent smallest plots are from Hoffmann (1998).
11 A lucrative enterprise in the south of Bahia from the late 18th century until the New York
stock market crash in 1929, the cultivation of cocoa became a symbol of colonels’ wealth and power.
Even after abolition of slavery, semifeudalist working conditions remained.
12 The so-called «coffee cycle» took place from 1800 to 1930 and was the driving force of
Brazil’s economy from the second half of the 19th century. Around 1838, coffee accounted for over
50 per cent of the country’s total exports (see Guimaraes 1968, p. 80). Like other cash crops, the
cultivation of the so-called black gold was very labor intensive and barons were dependent on the
supply of slaves or cheap hired labor.
13 It is important to note that the successful settlement of European immigrants was only
possible in rural areas not directly affected by the economic and political power of landlords. As put
forward by Guimaraes (1968, p. 131), the northeast and the state of Minas Gerais did not exhibit a
single case of successful European settlement.
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never established itself, while the small property regime spread rapidly
contributing to the emergence of free labor» (translated by the author).
Furthermore, with the Land Law of 1850, the Portuguese Crown had
given nearly a third of the province of Santa Catarina, and large areas
of Rio Grande do Sul and Parana´ to colonization companies. Secure
land titles and reasonable properties were guaranteed to mainly German,
Italian and Polish immigrants. As a consequence, the agrarian structure
of these states was formed mostly around smaller family properties (see
Hoffmann 1980). These European settlers were attracted in order to
address the labor shortage and to stimulate the cultivation of crops such
as maize or wheat, vital for the domestic market and neglected by the
large plantations.
In Espı´rito Santo especially, the arrival of immigrants from other states
— attracted by moderate land prices resulting from the state’s land-selling
policy at the end of the 19th century — promoted the proliferation of smaller
family farms. In the year 1920, the average size of rural properties in the state
was 42 hectares in the Vale do Rio Doce and 77.1 in the Vale do Itapemirim,
low figures compared to the rest of Brazil (see Almada 1993, p. 31)14.
Although Espı´rito Santo received an important number of European colo-
nizers, immigration did not play the same important role as in Brazil’s
southern states (see Almada 1993, p. 25).
As evident in Table 1, two other states figure among the most equal
ones: Roraima and Ceara´. Roraima’s low Gini index is a direct consequence
of this state’s equally distributed and very large plots. Its median area of
total properties in 1967 was 772 hectares (see Hoffmann 1998, p. 7). Thus,
the state’s apparently equal land distribution is simply a shortcoming of
the Gini index. When additional land concentration measures are taken into
account, Ceara´ also fares worse than the southern states or Espı´rito Santo.
An indication of this is the relatively modest total area of the 50 per cent
smallest rural properties shown in Table 1. As will become evident in the next
section, the interstate concentration patterns presented here have remained
largely unaltered throughout the last decades.
Having briefly analyzed the colonial roots of Brazil’s land inequalities and
outlined the regional differences within states’ agrarian structure, the next
section addresses the consequences of this variation for states’ educational
performance. Making use of historical data, it draws a picture of the different
educational performances across Brazil’s federal units in the 19th and 20th
centuries. Furthermore, it briefly describes the formulation of educational
policies and the schooling indicators within the states of Santa Catarina and
Espı´rito Santo.
14 The national average of rural properties in the same year was 270 hectares (see Guimaraes
1968, p. 209).
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6. AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND SCHOOLING IN 19TH AND
20TH CENTURIES BRAZIL
Profiting from the Brazilian Government Document Digitization Project
undertaken by the Center of Research Libraries15, the question of whether the
provinces mainly organized around family farming such as the southern
states, Espı´rito Santo and, to a minor extent, Sergipe exhibit better educa-
tional indicators, as previously hypothesized, will be investigated.
Table 2 lists the average primary school students’ registrations in the
years 1865, 1869, 1875 and 1885 (divided by the total population in 1872 and
1890)16. Clearly, the four provinces exhibiting the most equal land distribu-
tion are among the regions with the highest primary school matriculations.
Sergipe has the second highest level of primary students, followed by Rio
Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Espı´rito Santo and Parana´17. Furthermore, it
is striking how economically important provinces such as Bahia (a major
producer of cocoa) or Minas Gerais (a major cattle breeder and coffee pro-
ducer) or Sa˜o Paulo (a major coffee producer and the motor of the Brazilian
economy from the second half of the 19th century until 1920) neglected
primary education compared to the other states. The high figures for frontier
states with extremely low population densities such as Para´, Mato Grosso
and Amazonas have to be interpreted with care. Given their geography,
dominated by the rain forest, the population of Brazil’s three biggest states
was concentrated in capital cities such as Bele´m, Cuiaba´ or Manaus. It is to
be expected that the surveyed populations do not include residents outside
these major urban areas, distorting the results. Schools outside these few
major settlement areas were extremely rare.
Data showing states’ expenditure on primary education and literacy
rates confirm the cross-state variance in human capital formation depicted
above. By the year 1870, for example, the province of Santa Catarina spent
15 Among other interesting information, the project gathers provincial presidential reports
issued annually during the Imperial period. Subject access to selected quantitative information is
provided through links from the Subject Guide to Statistics in the Presidential Reports of the
Brazilian Provinces, 1830-1889 compiled by Ann Hartness (http://brazil.crl.edu/bsd/bsd/hartness/
index.html; March 11, 2009).
16 Data on primary school registration rates were gathered for each province by accessing the
various items catalogued under the category «primary education, public» available at http://brazil.
crl.edu/bsd/bsd/hartness/predpub.html. The demographic data are from IPEA and can be retrieved
from http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/ipeaweb.dll/ipeadata?113967296 (March 13, 2009).
17 Although sugarcane was an important commodity for Sergipe’s economy, the state was
leading in the production of cotton (Nunes 2006, p. 20). The cultivation of cotton did not require
large investments and was affordable for any small farmer. Thus, it is comprehensible that Sergipe
had a family farm share of 23 per cent in 1950, whereas the mean for the whole country was a mere
6 per cent (Barraclough 1973, p. 122). Nunes (2006 p. 21) points out that the latifundia system
that divided the society into landlords and slaves in other northeastern provinces never played a
significant role in this state.
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over three times more than Minas Gerais or Bahia on per capita primary
education18. Table 3 confirms the leading position of the southern states and
Espı´rito Santo as far as literacy figures are concerned. In 1900, all four states
exhibited lower illiteracy rates than the two politically most influential pro-
vinces at that time: Sa˜o Paulo and Minas Gerais. In Bahia and Pernambuco —
prime examples of agrarian economies based on the latifundia system — less
TABLE 2
PRIMARY SCHOOL REGISTRATION, 1865–1885
Provinces
Number of registered primary school students divided by
total population
Paraı´ba 0.0083
Bahia 0.0092
Minas Gerais 0.0092
Rio Janeiro and Court 0.0097
Goia´s 0.0097
Ceara´ 0.0103
Sa˜o Paulo 0.0123
Maranha˜o 0.0126
Pernambuco 0.0130
Rio Grande do Norte 0.0133
Amazonas 0.0141
Alagoas 0.0146
Mato Grosso 0.0147
Parana´ 0.0162
Espı´rito Santo 0.0165
Santa Catarina 0.0172
Rio Grande do Sul 0.0198
Sergipe 0.0254
Para´ 0.0260
18 Educational spending data were gathered for each single province by accessing the various
items catalogued under the category «educational expenditures» available at http://brazil.crl.edu/
bsd/bsd/hartness/educexp.html (September 20, 2009).
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than 30 per cent of the population was literate. Again, the low-illiteracy
numbers for frontier states such as Amazonas, Para´ or Mato Grosso are
rather a reflection of their extremely low population density than an effort to
educate their citizens.
Descriptive evidence of provinces’ effort to expand and ameliorate public
schooling confirms the picture shown by the historical statistics. With the so-
called Ato Adicional of 1824, provinces were allowed to make their own legis-
lation governing public primary and secondary instruction. Compared to most
of the other Brazilian states, Santa Catarina showed an early preoccupation
with extending and consolidating the schooling system. As early as 1874,
schooling was declared compulsory within the boundaries of the state. Rather
TABLE 3
LITERACY RATES IN 1900
Provinces Percentage of illiterate population (over 14 years of age)
Rio de Janeiro 51.83
Amazonas 58.27
Para´ 58.65
Espı´rito Santo 59.42
Rio Grande do Sul 60.38
Mato Grosso 63.34
Santa Catarina 63.54
Parana´ 64.60
Maranha˜o 65.37
Sa˜o Paulo 65.71
Minas Gerais 65.92
Sergipe 69.98
Rio Grande do Norte 71.08
Goia´s 71.14
Bahia 71.39
Ceara´ 71.58
Pernambuco 72.19
Alagoas 73.34
Paraı´ba 73.71
Piauı´ 74.29
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than representing a mere legal determination, Ulhoˆa Cintra, the provincial
president at that time, was concerned with truly enforcing compulsory educa-
tion (see Fiori 1991, p. 53). Recognizing that public instruction was still char-
acterized by deficient school inspection, unprepared teachers and poor-quality
instruction, the provincial Assembly of Santa Catarina approved an educational
reform in the year 1881. Among other measures, the reform introduced selec-
tion processes for the awarding of teaching chairs, lifelong tenure, seculariza-
tion of schooling, mixed schools and redefined the inspection system.
In 1911, Governor Vidal Ramos introduced additional ambitious educa-
tional reforms that profoundly altered the state’s public instruction system. The
efficient reorganization of public schooling promoted by Ramos was admired
by other states (see Fiori 1991, p. 83). New teaching and learning concepts —
rejecting servile memorization of learning matter — were propagated and there
was a strong concern with the quality of schooling, which led to an increase in
knowledge requirements for teachers and improved statistical coverage (Fiori
1991, p. 96). Writing on the state’s schooling system, the federal deputy Lebon
Regis affirmed that teaching supervision in Santa Catarina is «a reality like in
no other state» (Regis 1917, p. 18, translated by the author).
Like Santa Catarina, the state of Espı´rito Santo also exhibits an agrarian
structure in which smaller family farms always played a fundamental role.
However, as previously highlighted, this state was primarily populated
by internal immigrants rather than European settlers. By analyzing the state’s
educational performance, it is possible to verify whether the positive schooling
development in the south can be attributed exclusively to European immigration.
Table 2 reveals that Espı´rito Santo exhibited similar primary school enrollment
rates for the period 1865-1885 to the southern states. Furthermore, literacy rates
for the years 1940 and 1950 reveal that municipalities organized around family
farming showed a lower percentage of illiteracy among the population within
this state. Thus, municipalities with greater numbers of smaller farms such as
Santa Tereza, Santa Leopoldina or Cachoeiro had literacy rates of 43.63, 49.71
and 44.22 per cent, respectively. These figures were significantly lower in
municipalities dominated by large rural properties such as Alegre (34.70 per
cent), Mimoso do Sul (30.38 per cent) or Muqui (36.82 per cent). The state’s
average literacy for the same year was 39.75 per cent (see IBGE 1953, p. 6). Thus,
it seems unlikely that the superior educational performance of southern states is
solely an expression of European immigrants’ push for more education.
Looking into the 20th century, one can find a remarkable resilience of
states’ agrarian structure and a path-dependent pattern for educational fig-
ures in most of the federal units. Tables 4 and 5 provide information on land
Gini indices and the percentage of the states’ rural area corresponding to the
50 per cent smallest plots19. Considerable changes of both indicators are
19 Data for the year 1967 are from the first official register of rural estates kept by IBRA
(Instituto Brasileiro de Reforma Agra´ria). Data for the remaining years were drawn from the INCR
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TABLE 4
GINI INDEX OF THE LAND DISTRIBUTION WITHIN BRAZIL’S FEDERAL UNITS
States 1967 1972 1978 1992 1998
Rondoˆnia 0.948 0.903 0.770 0.644 0.644
Acre 0.944 0.955 0.962 0.889 0.872
Amazonas 0.844 0.857 0.935 0.937 0.929
Roraima 0.522 0.568 0.531 0.874 0.796
Para´ 0.871 0.883 0.863 0.892 0.889
Amapa´ 0.832 0.873 0.905 0.845 0.780
Maranha˜o 0.795 0.784 0.790 0.748 0.766
Piauı´ 0.776 0.775 0.780 0.751 0.774
Ceara´ 0.761 0.740 0.727 0.694 0.705
Rio Grande do Norte 0.784 0.792 0.777 0.747 0.766
Paraı´ba 0.791 0.784 0.775 0.761 0.766
Pernabuco 0.816 0.787 0.772 0.765 0.764
Alagoas 0.800 0.795 0.784 0.790 0.790
Sergipe 0.808 0.799 0.799 0.795 0.795
Bahia 0.787 0.776 0.836 0.808 0.831
Minas Gerais 0.769 0.761 0.773 0.754 0.762
Espı´rito Santo 0.569 0.597 0.609 0.629 0.645
Rio de Janeiro 0.799 0.751 0.761 0.737 0.751
Sa˜o Paulo 0.765 0.760 0.769 0.758 0.763
Parana´ 0.707 0.704 0.705 0.706 0.715
Santa Catarina 0.678 0.642 0.645 0.643 0.649
Rio Grande do Sul 0.745 0.729 0.718 0.725 0.730
Mato Grosso 0.858 0.867 0.855 0.817 0.811
Goias 0.761 0.755 0.741 0.721 0.731
Distrito Federal 0.857 0.775 0.810 0.788 0.811
(F’note continued)
(Instituto Nacional de Colonizacao e Reforma Agra´ria) register. The data are available in Hoffmann
(1998).
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TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AREA CORRESPONDING TO THE 50 PER CENT
SMALLEST PLOTS
States 1967 1972 1978 1992 1998
Rondoˆnia 0.4 2.7 10.3 14.1 13.9
Acre 0.3 0.6 0.5 4.1 4.9
Amazonas 1.9 2.2 0.8 1.6 2.1
Roraima 13.9 13.0 8.6 4.3 8.2
Para´ 2.5 2.1 2.9 2.8 3.2
Amapa´ 1.6 1.8 2.6 5.6 8.1
Maranha˜o 3.1 4.9 5.0 6.8 6.2
Piauı´ 4.1 4.6 4.9 6.7 5.9
Ceara´ 4.7 5.9 6.4 7.6 7.1
Rio Grande do Norte 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.7 5.1
Paraı´ba 4.3 4.7 5.0 5.3 5.1
Pernabuco 3.8 4.5 4.8 4.9 4.9
Alagoas 4.5 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.8
Sergipe 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9
Bahia 4.4 5.0 3.6 4.3 3.6
Minas Gerais 4.6 5.2 5.1 5.8 5.4
Espı´rito Santo 14.1 13.4 13.1 11.8 11.0
Rio de Janeiro 3.7 5.7 5.4 6.1 5.6
Sa˜o Paulo 5.5 5.9 5.6 5.9 5.7
Parana´ 9.2 9.6 9.4 9.3 8.9
Santa Catarina 9.4 11.7 11.8 12.1 11.8
Rio Grande do Sul 7.8 8.6 9.2 8.8 8.5
Mato Grosso 1.1 1.2 1.5 2.8 2.8
Goias 4.7 5.5 5.9 6.4 6.0
Distrito Federal 3.3 4.6 3.1 4.4 3.9
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limited to the northern states. In Roraima, the Gini index increased drasti-
cally in the year 1992. However, as already outlined, the relatively low Gini
indices for this state in the previous years merely reflected the small number
of very large land properties20.
Rondoˆnia experienced an extraordinary drop in the Gini index, with a
simultaneous reduction in the rural property mean. In this state, government
intervention in the rural property structure formation was the most pro-
nounced one. In respect to the percentage area corresponding to the 50 per
cent smallest plots, Amapa´ and Acre — along with the already mentioned
states of Roraima and Rondoˆnia — exhibit the biggest variance in land
inequality. All these drastic changes can be attributed to the fact that the
northern states have been colonized relatively recently. In general, this table
reveals that the variance across and within Brazil’s federal units was very
modest for the analyzed period.
When changes in states’ economic structure and educational perfor-
mance are analyzed in light of the reported resilience in land inequality, an
interesting pattern can be observed. Table 6 shows that the ten Brazilian
states exhibiting the lowest share of citizens with less than 4 years of
schooling in the year 1970 are either predominantly urban (or do not rely
much on rural economies) such as Rio de Janeiro, Distrito Federal, Sa˜o
Paulo or Amapa´ or maintain high incomes from agriculture while enjoying
relatively low land inequality such as Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina,
Roraima, Espı´rito Santo or Parana´21. It is striking, for example, that while
23 per cent of Rio Grande do Sul’s income is generated by the rural
economy, it has a higher rate of citizens with at least 4 years of schooling
than Sa˜o Paulo, economically the most developed state in the country.
In contrast, rural states, characterized by higher levels of land inequality,
such as Maranha˜o, Acre, Mato Grosso, Para´ or Amazonas, fare worse
regarding the analyzed educational indicator. Thus, it seems fairly safe to
conclude that the relationship between land inequality and education has
survived within rural states well into modern times. Considering that, by
the end of the 1960s, half of Brazil’s territory was still in the hands of
plantation owners (see Hagopian 1996); this conclusion does not appear
particularly surprising.
The descriptive statistics reported above, although corroborating the
main argument of this paper, can only serve as preliminary evidence. Given
the scarcity of historical data, more sophisticated statistical tools cannot be
applied. The next section makes use of more recent data, asking whether the
20 See page 118.
21 The source of the presented data on schooling and the percentage of states’ rural income as a
share of their GDP is IBGE. Data on the Gini index and the area corresponding to the 50 per cent
smallest plots are from IBRA. All these indicators are available at www.ipeadata.gov.br (March 10,
2009).
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TABLE 6
LAND CONCENTRATION, SCHOOLING AND RURAL INCOME AROUND 1970
States
Less than 4
years of
schooling (%)
(25 years and
older) 1970
Percentage of
total area corre-
sponding to 50%
smallest plots
1967
Gini index
of land
distribution
1967
Share of
agricultural
GDP over
total GDP
1970
Rio de Janeiro 46.3 5.7 0.799 0.02
Distrito Federal 49.2 4.6 0.857 0.004
Rio Grande do Sul 54.8 8.6 0.745 0.23
Sa˜o Paulo 55.9 5.9 0.765 0.06
Santa Catarina 67.1 1.7 0.678 0.25
Minas Gerais 73.9 5.2 0.769 0.18
Roraima 74.2 13.0 0.522 0.34
Amapa´ 75.2 1.8 0.832 0.08
Espı´rito Santo 76.5 13.4 0.569 0.21
Parana´ 76.7 9.6 0.707 0.28
Rondoˆnia 77.4 2.7 0.948 0.22
Para´ 77.6 2.1 0.871 0.23
Amazonas 78.1 2.2 0.844 0.24
Pernambuco 80.1 4.5 0.816 0.14
Goias 81 5.5 0.761 0.35
Mato Grosso 81.8 1.2 0.858 0.37
Bahia 84.6 5.0 0.787 0.23
Rio Grande do Norte 85 4.3 0.784 0.19
Ceara´ 86 5.9 0.761 0.19
Sergipe 86.8 3.8 0.808 0.21
Paraı´ba 87.1 4.7 0.791 0.27
Acre 87.5 0.6 0.944 0.41
Alagoas 88 4.8 0.800 0.29
Piauı´ 89.8 4.6 0.776 0.32
Maranha˜o 90.1 4.9 0.795 0.43
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association between agrarian structure and educational outcomes holds for
more recent years.
7. CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
For the cross-sectional regression analyses presented in this part, a vari-
ety of educational indicators have been chosen. As a starting point, an output
measure reflecting states’ secondary schooling coverage has been selected for
the year 2000: the share of the population between 15 and 17 years of age
attending secondary education22. This indicator may give us a particularly
good idea of the scope of each state’s secondary school system. In contrast to
the historical analysis, this part concentrates on public secondary schooling,
given that cross-state differences are much larger for this educational level in
present times.
To proxy for states’ agrarian structure, the land Gini index for the year
1995 was used. Data are from the 1995-1996 Censo Agropecua´rio from the
IBGE, which unfortunately is the last agrarian census carried out in the
country23. As already noted, the Gini index does not always reflect states’
agrarian structure in a valid manner (e.g. when states’ land ownership
structure consists of very large, equally distributed plots). In fact, the mea-
sure does not necessarily reflect the size of landholdings. Therefore, the
percentage of the total area corresponding to the rural plots smaller than the
median (the 50 per cent smallest plots), taken from Hoffmann (1998, p. 9),
was also employed.
Several control variables frequently found in the literature have been
included. Unless otherwise noted, all of them represent the year 2000. The
percentage of children between 5 and 9 years of age was considered in order
to account for possible demographic differences across states. Those federal
units with a relatively high share of young people are expected to devote
more resources to basic schooling and have more students enrolled at these
educational levels. Since the performance of educational systems is found to
be worse in rural areas, the total share of the rural population in each state
was taken24. To measure the impact of economic modernization on educa-
tional indicators, states’ per capita income in 2000 was included in all
models25. Richer units are expected to show a more highly developed sec-
ondary school system. In order to take account of recent findings showing a
positive correlation between electoral competition and educational spending
and coverage (e.g. Hecock 2006), the level of political competitiveness within
22 Data are from the IBGE demographic census of the year 2000, available at http://www.
ibge.gov.br/home or http://www.ipeadata.gov.br (April 10, 2009).
23 These data may also be retrieved from the websites listed in the previous footnote.
24 Data for both variables are from the IBGE demographic census.
25 Data were estimated by IPEA: http://www.ipeadata.gov.br.
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each state was also considered. The variable was measured by the number of
effective parties in states’ legislative assembly following the operationaliza-
tion proposed by Laakso and Teegapera (1979)26. Finally, regional dummies
for Brazil’s north and northeast were included to account for possible
structural instability. Both regions clearly lag behind in most of the country’s
economic and social indicators and, as previously shown, also exhibit the
greatest land inequalities.
Table 7 shows the results of simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sions using robust standard errors. In order to normalize the distribution of
the dependent variable, the negative reciprocal was taken. After the trans-
formation, a skewness–kurtosis test certified that the sample at hand came
from a normally distributed population. In addition, Cook and Weisberg tests
for heteroscedasticity indicate that the null hypothesis of constant error
variance cannot be rejected — which applies for all the regression results
reported in this paper.
Clearly, land inequality measured by the Gini index significantly decrea-
ses the share of the population between 15 and 17 years of age attending
secondary education (model 1 of Table 7). The effect magnitude is con-
siderable, as secondary school attendance drops by 0.21 standard deviations
with each one standard deviation increase in land Gini indices. Only
the coefficients of the dummy variables accounting for the northeastern
and northern states are larger. All remaining control variables are non-
significant. The results are similar when the percentage of the total area
corresponding to the 50 per cent smallest plots is used as an alternative
operationalization of the agrarian structure (model 2)27. The more the total
rural area is constituted by smaller plots, the higher the rate of secondary
school attendance. Under this model specification, the demographic variable
measuring the share of the population between 5 and 9 years of age also
turns out to be significant at the 10 per cent level, decreasing secondary
school attendance. It can be expected that states showing a very young
population tend to concentrate on primary schooling. Employing alternative
educational indicators, such as the share of the population above the age of
9 years having completed 8 years of study as a dependent variable, yields
very similar results28.
26 Following the seminal works of Duverger (1954) and Sartori (1976), the effective number of
parties has become one of the most frequently used aggregate quantities to describe partisan con-
figurations or electoral competition. In this paper, alternative operationalizations of electoral
competition such as the indices of competitiveness developed by Santos (1997) for Brazil were also
applied, but did not change the results substantially. The data used can be retrieved from http://
www.ucam.edu.br/leex/ (May 10, 2009).
27 A reduction of the number of observations from twenty-seven (model 1) to twenty-five (model
2) is due to missing data on the share of the 50 per cent smallest plots for the states of Mato Grosso
do Sul and Tocantins.
28 Because of space constraints, these results will not be reported here but are available upon
request.
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An important caveat of educational indicators that measure attendance or
attainment is their inability to account for schooling quality. A state, for
example, may have nearly 100 per cent of its children attending elementary
school. Effectively, however, only a small minority of them might in fact be
able to read and write. Thus, it is necessary to assess the efforts made by the
states to deliver high-quality educational policies. In 2005, Brazil’s Ministry
of Education (MEC) together with the Instituto Nacional de Estudos e
Pesquisas Educacionais Anı´sio Teixeira (INEP) developed an index of school
TABLE 7
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SHARE OF POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 17 YEARS
OF AGE ATTENDING SECONDARY EDUCATION
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Landgini 28.060
(3.300)**
Share of plots smaller than the median (50% smallest) 0.145
(0.079)*
Rural population 0.021 20.008
(0.040) (0.048)
Population 5-9 years 20.371 20.588
(0.305) (0.300)*
Per capita income 0.005 0.003
(0.005) (0.004)
Effective number of parties 0.049 0.020
(0.098) (0.124)
North 21.872 21.059
(0.897)* (1.089)
Northeast 22.491 23.060
(0.707)*** (0.871)***
Constant 15.522 13.524
(4.173)*** (4.532)**
Number of observations 27 25
R2 0.866 0.854
Prob.F 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Ordinary least square (OLS) regressions using robust standard errors. Standard errors are given
in parentheses.
**Significant for P, 0.05; *P, 0.1; ***P, 0.01.
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quality for each state. The IDEB index combines information on students’
performance on standardized examinations (Prova Brasil or Seab) with
information on students’ school performance (average pass rate)29. The
index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating better quality.
Table 8 reveals that the secondary schooling system of states exhibiting
concentrated land ownership patterns suffers from an inferior teaching
quality. Even after the introduction of the regional dummies (model 2),
the main variable measuring states’ agrarian structure remains negative and
TABLE 8
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: QUALITY OF SECONDARY EDUCATION
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Landgini 22.954 23.443
(0.678)**** (0.909)***
Share of plots smaller than the median
(50% smallest)
0.045
(0.024)*
Rural population 0.007 0.011 0.007
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Per capita income 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.00017)* (0.0006)* (0.0009)
Effective number of parties 0.022 0.035 0.037
(0.024) (0.029) (0.030)
North 20.222 20.202
(0.210) (0.270)
Northeast 20.028 20.158
(0.160) (0.247)
Constant 4.605 4.888 1.917
(0.733)**** (0.797)**** (0.498)***
Number of observations 27 27 25
R2 0.557 0.610 0.549
Prob.F 0.0001 0.0005 0.0009
Note: Ordinary least square (OLS) regressions using robust standard errors. Standard errors are given
in parentheses.
****Significant for P, 0.001; ***P, 0.01; *P, 0.1.
29 The IDEB index can be downloaded at http://ideb.inep.gov.br/Site/ (February 10, 2009).
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highly significant. When standardized coefficients are calculated30, the
variable landgini has the greatest effect magnitude of all. Each one standard
deviation increase decreases the IDEB index score by 0.62 standard devia-
tions. Furthermore, it seems that richer states also exhibit better-prepared
secondary students. This assertion, however, does not hold for model 3. All
other coefficients remain identical when the alternative operationalization of
land concentration (share of the 50 per cent smallest plots) is employed31.
Note that the percentage of the population between 5 and 9 years of age was
excluded from the analysis as there are no theoretical grounds to believe that
states’ demography has an impact on schooling quality.
Up to this point, only output variables have been employed to describe each
state’s educational system. Many authors argue in favor of the superiority of
these indicators relative to incidence-based measures. Government-spending
levels, for example, can be distorted by patterns of «hidden» rents32. Never-
theless, this paper will make use of educational spending figures in order to test
the political economy mechanism formulated in section 3 explicitly. Assuming
that the rural elite has no interest in the promotion of broadly targeted edu-
cational policies, it can be expected that governments under the influence of this
elite will refrain from investing in the school system. The next analysis uses
states’ overall educational expenditures divided by their total population
between the years 2003 and 2005 as a dependent variable. The data are reported
by IPEA and is expressed in Reais (thousand)33. To transform the variable into a
normally distributed one, the negative reciprocal root was taken.
Rather than proxy the influence of agrarian elites by drawing on the land-
ownership patterns within each state, a more direct measure of landlords’
political articulation capacity will be employed. The so-called bancada ruralista
is a good indicator of landowners’ current political power. This powerful rural
interest group encompasses federal deputies and senators from different poli-
tical parties that defend the interests of large landowners within the National
Congress. During the legislature of 2003-2007, the bancada ruralista consisted
of 111 federal deputies (from a total of 513 seats), as calculated by the Depar-
tamento Intersindical de Assessoria parlamentar (Diap). These deputies were
extremely successful in maintaining the current land distribution patterns and
agricultural work relations. In the Chamber of Deputies, for example, they
repeatedly blocked the constitutional amendment PEC 438/2001, which foresees
the confiscation of properties employing slave work.
For each new legislature, the Diap publishes the names of federal deputies
and senators pertaining to the referred interest group, examining whether
30 Results are available upon request.
31 The effect size of the area corresponding to the 50 per cent smallest plots is similar to that
reported for the land Gini index.
32 See, for example, Baum and Lake (2003, p. 336).
33 Data can be downloaded from www.ipeadata.gov.br (February 19, 2009).
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congressmen embraced the causes of this particular advocacy group in the
plenary sessions, the commissions or in interviews. Most of the representa-
tives openly state their membership in their curricula posted on the chamber
of deputies’ website. The total number of federal deputies and senators
belonging to the bancada ruralista in each state during the legislature
TABLE 9
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: TOTAL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE
DIVIDED BY POPULATION
Bancada ruralista 20.024
(0.011)**
Population between 10 and 19 years 0.119
(0.065)*
Left 0.499
(0.126)***
Center 0.219
(0.125)
Federal government transfers 0.015
(0.004)***
Per capita Income 0.001
(0.001)
Effective number of parties 20.022
(0.037)
North 20.135
(0.187)
Northeast 20.758
(0.259)**
Constant 24.677
(01.645)**
Number of observations 25
R2 0.829
Prob.F 0.0000
Note: Ordinary least square (OLS) regressions using robust standard errors.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
**Significant for P, 0.05; *P, 0.1; ***P, 0.01.
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2003-2007 will be employed as a measure of landlords’ political influence34.
In addition to the control variables included in the former models35,
two more were added: the federal educational transfers to the states in the
period 2003-2005 (reported by IPEA) and a dummy variable reflecting the
partisanship of the major state legislative party in the year 200436. According
to conventional wisdom, left-wing parties are expected to spend more on
social policies.
As can be seen in Table 9, the higher the number of members belonging to
the described interest group within each state, the less is spent on education.
The coefficient for the variable bancada is negative and significant at the 5
per cent level. Three control variables reached statistical significance. In
accordance with the literature, left-wing parties seem to spend more on
schooling. Also, the more educational transfers the federal government
makes to the single states, the higher their total expenditure on education.
Finally, demographically younger states (with a higher share of their popu-
lation between 10 and 19 years of age) disburse more on the schooling sys-
tem. Once more, northeastern states lag behind, spending less on education
than the other states.
Concerning the robustness of the results, several checks were carried
out. First, the robustness of including and excluding one or more control
variables in the preferred specification was verified, applying a technique
recently developed by Barslund (2007). The author provides a STATA module
to perform robustness checks of alternative specifications37. The command
estimates a set of regressions in which the dependent variable is regressed on
core variables — which are included in all regressions — and all possible
combinations of other (non-core) variables. An analysis of predictors’ var-
iance inflation factor (VIF) confirmed that the results are not driven by
multicollinearity.38 In addition, two varieties of robust regressions that resist
the pull of outliers — giving them better-than-OLS efficiency in case of non-
normal, outlier-prone error distributions — were applied39. In addition,
dropping one state at a time did not alter the results substantially. The tests
indicate that all models presented in this section are robust to alternative
specifications and are not driven by single outliers.
34 These data are available at Diap’s Website: www.diap.gov.br (February 19, 2009).
35 The variable measuring the effective number of parties was taken for the year 2002, per
capita income and the share of the population between 10 and 19 years of age for the year 2000.
36 These data were kindly provided by George Avelino.
37 The ado-file for the command «checkrob» can be downloaded at http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/
bocode/c/checkrob.ado.
38 Chatterjee et al. (2000) suggest the following guideline for the presence of multicollinearity:
The largest VIF is greater than ten or the mean VIF is larger than one.
39 The two robust regressions performed are quantile regressions and another technique that
rests upon iteratively reweighted least square (IRLS) procedures. They were estimated by the
STATA commands «rreg» and «qreg.»
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8. CONCLUSIONS
Given the general academic consent regarding the importance of educa-
tion for countries’ development, it is surprising how little attention the social
sciences have paid to the effect of structural variables such as landownership
patterns on the formation of human capital. Trying to address this short-
coming within the literature, this paper explored the impact of different
agrarian structures on the schooling system of the Brazilian states.
The paper has concentrated on the political economy argument, suggest-
ing that landlords had no interest in the expansion of schooling out of the fear
of higher taxes as well as the loss of a cheap, coerced labor force and their
monopoly over the decision-making process. By describing several episodes
of Brazil’s history of education, the paper provided positive evidence for the
proposed causal mechanism. In this manner, it tried to remediate a frequently
found shortcoming of quantitative, macrocomparative studies, which limit
themselves to showing significant correlations without truly addressing and
testing particular channels. Brazil proved particularly useful for this purpose,
given that it has a tradition of plantation-style agriculture and, simulta-
neously, exhibits federal units with a rural economy organized around
smaller family farms. Moreover, the country’s primary and secondary edu-
cation lies largely in the hands of each individual state.
The overview of Brazil’s history of education revealed the importance of
politically influential groups such as landlords in the formulation of educa-
tional policies. It showed, especially, that traditional forces represented by
the rural aristocracy tried to maintain the elitist character of the educational
system, depriving the masses from citizenship-enhancing schooling while
favoring the development of higher education. Long-winded and mostly
unsuccessful attempts to reform the educational system illustrated this point.
Through this course of action, the rural elite maintained their strong political
power and the agrarian structure characterized by high land inequality and
coercive working relations for a long time.
Descriptive analysis of historical data showed that economically important
provinces whose agriculture was based on plantations employing slave or
cheap hired labor lagged behind with respect to student registration rates.
More recent data evidenced little variation of land distribution patterns across
and within states as well as enduring educational backwardness in pre-
dominantly agrarian and unequal federal units. Inferential statistics corrobo-
rated the paper’s main claim. Cross-section regression analysis showed that
states exhibiting higher land equality systematically outperform less egalitarian
units concerning school coverage and educational quality. This is especially
true for the secondary school system. Finally, states with a high number of
congressmen belonging to the interest group bancada ruralista invest less in
education. Thus, supportive evidence was provided to demonstrate large
landlords’ aversion to governmental schooling expenditures.
TIM WEGENAST
134 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
Much room remains for future research. Upcoming studies should con-
centrate on disentangling and testing the single channels through which the
agrarian structure impacts countries’ educational policies. This would surely
improve our understanding of the formulation of public policies and, above
all, would be particularly relevant for many developing countries which are
still highly dependent on agricultural production. Another interesting line of
research to be explored is the possible interconnectedness of the rural and
industrial elites and its impact on human capital formation.
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